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Footnotes 
1. 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009).
2. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
3. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
4. Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1718.
5. Id. at 1723.
6. 541 U.S. 615 (2004).
7. As shown in a Lexis search conducted on October 18, 2009.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s October 2008 Term gave us anumber of very important criminal law and procedurecases.  The Court overruled long-standing precedents on
automobile searches and post-arraignment interrogation.  The
justices also addressed whether the use of a forensic chemist’s
report violates the Confrontation Clause.  These three deci-
sions affect routine police and courtroom practices; undoubt-
edly, there will be periods of adjustment for judges, lawyers,
and police.  The Term was also marked by other Fourth
Amendment holdings, including one that either transforms
the exclusionary rule or merely draws it closer to the rule’s
underlying purpose, depending on one’s point of view.  This
article reviews some of the most significant criminal-law-
related opinions of the Supreme Court’s 2008-2009 Term,
with an emphasis on the decisions that have the greatest
impact upon the states.  The article concludes with a brief pre-
view of the current Term.
FOURTH AMENDMENT
During the 2007-2008 Term, the Court issued only one
Fourth Amendment decision.  Last year, the justices made up
for lost time.  Some of the Court’s most far-reaching rulings
were on Fourth Amendment issues. 
Vehicle Searches
In Arizona v. Gant,1 the Supreme Court revisited the scope
of a vehicle search incident to an arrest.  There may have been
decisions by the Court last Term of broader importance, but
this ruling impacts the way officers do their job every day.
The respondent in Gant was arrested on an outstanding
warrant for driving on a suspended license.  Officers saw Gant
pull into his driveway.  They called to him after he got out of
his car, and Gant met the officers about 10-12 feet from the
vehicle.  He was handcuffed and eventually placed in the back
of a patrol car.  Afterwards, officers searched the car and found
a bag of cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the back seat.
The trial court determined that the officers did not have prob-
able cause to search the car but that the narcotics were found
pursuant to a permissible search incident to an arrest.  The
Arizona Supreme Court reversed, saying that there was no jus-
tification for the search of the car after Gant was handcuffed
and secured.  The U.S. Supreme Court split 5-4, but agreed.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens noted the twin
rationales for a search incident to an arrest set forth in Chimel
v. California2—officer safety and preservation of contraband.
In New York v. Belton,3 the Court upheld the search of an auto-
mobile incident to an arrest where an officer had stopped a car,
smelled marijuana, and observed an envelope on the floor that
appeared to be associated with marijuana.  The occupants of
the car were not all handcuffed.  Applying Chimel, the Court
accepted the State’s argument that it was reasonable for the
officer to believe the arrestees could have accessed the vehicle
and its contents.  Nevertheless, as Justice Stevens wrote, Belton
has subsequently been “widely understood to allow a vehicle
search incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there
is no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at
the time of the search.”4 The majority in Gant rejected this
broad reading of Belton, though they also went further than
Chimel in one respect—the justices determined that officers
could search a car if they believed that evidence relating to the
offense of arrest was inside.  Gant thus provides that “[p]olice
may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only
if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger
compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to
believe that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of
arrest.”5 Justice Scalia concurred.  He would have held that a
vehicle search incident to arrest is reasonable only when the
object of the search is evidence of crime (as opposed to officer
safety) but voted with the majority so that there would be an
opinion commanding five votes.  The dissenting justices criti-
cized the majority for (in their view) overruling Belton and
Thornton v. United States.6 Justice Alito wrote the primary dis-
sent, arguing that the circumstances did not justify abandoning
the general understanding of Belton.
In the first six months after the April 2009 decision in
Gant, the decision was cited in over 250 reported cases.7 A
pattern has not yet emerged.  Courts are applying the Gant cri-
teria (officer safety and the belief that the vehicle may contain
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8. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 569 F.3d 813 (8th Cir. 2009);
United States v. Grice, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 14431 (11th Cir.
2009); People v. Osborne, 175 Cal. App. 4th 1052 (Cal. Ct. App.
2009); McCloud v. Commonwealth, 286 S.W.3d 780 (Ky. 2009).
9. See, e.g., People v. Estrada, 2009 Ill. App. LEXIS 819 (Ill. App. Ct.
2009); State v. Henning, 209 P.3d 711 (Kan. 2009) (invalidating a
state statute post-Gant); State v. Keaton, 2009 Kan. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 761 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009); State v. Carter, 682 S.E.2d 416
(N.C. Ct. App. 2009); State v. McCormick, 2009 Wash. App. LEXIS
2240 (Wash. Ct.  App. 2009).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Kellam, 568 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2009);
United States v. Martinez-Cortes, 566 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 2009);
United States v. Morillo, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94396 (E.D.N.Y.
2009); United States v. Gilbert, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (W.D. Pa.
2009); United States v. Arriaza, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59299 (E.D.
Va. 2009); Meister v. State, 912 N.E.2d 412 (Ind. 2009); State v.
Canter, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 4076 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009).
11. 129 S.Ct. 781 (2009).
12. 129. S.Ct. 2633 (2009).
13. While the opinion gave other reasons for this conclusion, one
astute commentator (a former assistant to the solicitor general)
noted:  “Right off the bat, I’m suspicious of the school adminis-
trators here, because as a socially aware person who is knowl-
edgeable about the younger generation from watching the WB,
I’m fairly confident that no teenaged girl today owns a piece of
clothing anywhere near big enough to conceal such a large tablet.”
John P. Elwood, What Were They Thinking:  The Supreme Court in
Revue, October Term 2008, 12 GREEN BAG 2d 429, 440 (2009).
14. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
15. Safford, 129 S.Ct. at 2642.
16. Id. at 2643.
evidence of the crime of arrest) to uphold vehicle searches
incident to arrest8 as well as to invalidate them,9 depending on
the relevant facts.  Gant did not undermine the other bases for
warrantless searches of automobiles, and courts have thus
often considered whether evidence no longer admissible post-
Gant may nevertheless be admitted because of a different law-
ful basis for the search (though some appellate courts may not
be free to consider grounds to uphold a search not argued
below).10 One interesting question, which I address below
after discussing Herring v. United States (the exclusionary rule
case), is whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary
rule saves evidence seized in violation of Gant but obtained in
reliance on Belton.
Another Fourth Amendment decision, Arizona v. Johnson,11
may also be of interest, though it is much less momentous
than Gant.  There, the justices addressed whether officers may
frisk a passenger in a car that is stopped for a traffic violation.
Arizona police stopped a vehicle for a traffic infraction.  The
car had three occupants.  Based on their observations and
their conversation with a back-seat passenger, Johnson, offi-
cers suspected that Johnson had a weapon.  He was asked to
get out of the car and was patted down, and a gun was found.
It has been clear for some time that once a vehicle has been
detained for a traffic violation, police may order the driver to
get out of the automobile and may frisk him if the officer rea-
sonably believes the driver is armed and dangerous.  The
Court had also previously determined that passengers may be
ordered out of the vehicle following a traffic stop.  In Johnson,
the justices unanimously held that a passenger as well as a dri-
ver may be frisked if the officer reasonably suspects that the
passenger is armed and dangerous. 
School Searches
One of the most closely followed cases of the Term was
Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding,12 which dealt with
whether school officials violated the Fourth Amendment by
partially strip-searching a student for drugs.  School officials
had found a day planner in which there were several knives,
lighters, a cigarette, and several pills (four prescription-
strength ibuprofens and one over-the-counter pill for pain and
inflammation).  The planner belonged to a 13-year old middle
school student, Savana Redding.  Redding told the assistant
principal that the planner
was hers, but that she had
loaned it several days earlier
to another student.  She
denied that any of the items
in the planner belonged to
her.  School officials
searched Redding’s back-
pack, finding nothing.  The
assistant principal
instructed a female adminis-
trative assistant to take
Redding to the nurse’s office.
The assistant and the nurse told Redding to pull out her bra
and the elastic on her undergarments.  No pills were found.
Redding’s mother filed a civil-rights suit against the school
district and individuals.  The district court found no Fourth
Amendment violation.  The court of appeals reversed.
By a vote of 8-1, the Supreme Court ruled that school offi-
cials violated Redding’s Fourth Amendment rights by con-
ducting a strip-search.  The Court did not question the ability
of the school district to promulgate a rule banning all drugs,
no matter how benign, without advance permission.  School
officials had sufficient suspicion to search the student’s back-
pack and outer clothing.  But there was insufficient evidence
to support the much more intrusive additional search.13 The
opinion by Justice Souter acknowledges that, as previously
held in New Jersey v. T.L.O.,14 school officials do not need
probable cause to conduct a search.  The standard is reason-
able suspicion, but the search must be reasonably related to its
objectives and must not be excessively intrusive in light of the
age and gender of the student and the type of infraction under
investigation.  In this case, there was no indication of danger
to students from the power of the drugs or their quantity, nor
was there any reason to believe that Redding was carrying
pills in her underwear.  Thus, “the content of the suspicion
failed to match the degree of intrusion.”15 Further, there must
be support for a reasonable suspicion of danger to the stu-
dents or of resort to hiding evidence in underwear “before a
search can reasonably make a quantum leap from outer
clothes and backpacks to exposure of intimate parts.”16
Although the majority found a constitutional violation,
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seven justices determined that
school officials were entitled
to qualified immunity, partic-
ularly in light of lower-court
rulings applying T.L.O.
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg
dissented from this part of the
majority opinion.  They
would have found the law suf-
ficiently clear to hold the
school officials liable.    Justice Thomas agreed with the major-
ity’s judgment on qualified immunity but dissented from the
Fourth Amendment holding.  He would have found no consti-
tutional violation and would have ruled instead that judges
should not second-guess the measures taken by school officials
to maintain discipline and to ensure the health and safety of
the students in their charge.
The Exclusionary Rule
While Gant and Redding affect day-to-day policing, their
impact appears limited to certain types of searches.  Another
of the Court’s decisions, Herring v. United States,17 may have a
much wider influence.
In Herring, a warrant clerk called the sheriff ’s office in a
neighboring county to determine if the defendant (who was
retrieving items from an impounded truck) had an outstand-
ing warrant.  The neighboring county’s computer database
erroneously indicated that there was an outstanding arrest
warrant for failure to appear on a felony charge.  Relying upon
this information, an officer arrested the defendant and found
drugs and a weapon in his possession.  The question for the
Supreme Court was whether evidence is inadmissible under
the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule when an officer
conducts an unconstitutional search but acts on information
negligently maintained by law enforcement in a database.
By a 5-4 vote, the Court held that the evidence should not
be suppressed.  In his opinion for the majority, Chief Justice
Roberts pointed to United States v. Leon18 and other cases, and
he noted that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is deter-
rence.  He wrote that “[t]o trigger the exclusionary rule,
police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion
can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such
deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.”19
Exclusion is not automatic.  When police errors “are the result
of negligence . . . rather than systemic error or reckless disre-
gard of constitutional requirements, any marginal deterrence
does not ‘pay its way.’”20 Justice Ginsburg wrote the primary
dissent, arguing that the exclusionary rule is not as narrowly
focused as presented by the majority (it has “a more majestic
conception”21) and that the rule is essential to command
respect for the Fourth Amendment.  She also pointed out that
the majority’s suggestion of only marginal deterrence when
the misconduct is merely careless runs counter to the premise
of tort law:  liability for negligence creates an incentive to act
with greater care.  Exclusion here would encourage those who
maintain databases to act more carefully.22 Justice Breyer also
dissented to note that a previous case forgiving a recordkeep-
ing error (Arizona v. Evans23) addressed an error by a court
clerk, not a mistake by police. 
The case is significant in a number of respects and leaves
several questions unanswered.  First, by holding that exclu-
sion is not automatic and that the exclusionary rule only
applies when deterrence outweighs harm to the justice sys-
tem, Herring invites courts to consider whether exclusion is
justified in a broad range of circumstances in which it may be
claimed that officers acted without bad intent or recklessness,
or where there was not some other sort of systemic error.
While the Herring Court cited to Leon, Herring broadened the
good-faith exception beyond instances in which officers relied
in good faith on judges (as in Leon), court clerks or other non-
law-enforcement actors.  Second, though the majority wrote
that “[t]he pertinent analysis of deterrence and culpability is
objective” rather than subjective,24 one may expect substantial
litigation and uncertainty over these issues.  Third, if exclu-
sion is only “triggered” when there is a need for deterrence or
the other requisite elements are in place, is it the defendant’s
burden to prove that exclusion is required, or is it the State’s
burden of showing that it meets a good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule?25
In the first ten months since Herring was announced, the
decision has been cited in many reported cases.  While there
are a number of rulings applying Herring and finding officers’
conduct sufficiently or insufficiently culpable as to require
exclusion,26 it is too early to discern trends.  It is also not yet
clear whether the tendency will be for courts to make the
deterrence and culpability determinations case-by-case on an
infinite variety of facts, or whether more categorical
approaches will emerge (such as in Hudson v. Michigan,27
17. 129 S.Ct. 695 (2009).
18. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
19. 129 S.Ct. at 702.
20. Id. at 704 (citation omitted).
21. Id. at 707 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting; citation omitted).
22. Id. at 707-708.
23. 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
24. 129 S.Ct. at 703.
25. See id. at 705 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“even when deliberate or
reckless conduct is afoot . . . [h]ow is an impecunious defendant
to make the required showing?”)
26. Conduct insufficiently culpable to support exclusion:  E.g., United
States v. Groves, 559 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 2009) (police dispatcher’s
mistake); United States v. Stabile, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4263
(D.N.J. 2009) (at most negligent errors in coordinating among
multiple agencies); United States v. Davis, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
83864 (D. Md. 2009) (error in retaining profile in DNA database);
Delker v. State, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 597 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)
(mistaken belief that officer was still within his jurisdiction).
Conduct sufficiently culpable to support exclusion:  E.g., United
States v. Ryan, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53644 (D. Vt. 2009) (use of
facially invalid warrant); United States v. Parson, 599 F. Supp. 2d
592 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (tactics in attempting to obtain consent to
search); United States v. Moore, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81547 (E.D.
Tenn. 2009) (intentional conduct in searching without reasonable
suspicion); People v. Morgan, 901 N.E.2d 1049 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009)
(use of old warrant list, and failure to verify existence of warrant).
27. 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
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28. See Morgan, 901 N.E.2d at 1060 (“the State failed to meet its bur-
den of proof that the good-faith exception should apply, and
exclusion was the proper remedy”); People v. Pearl, 92 Cal. Rptr.
3d 85, 88 (Cal. App. 2009) (in Herring, the Court “further defined
the good faith exception, but did not alter the prosecution’s bur-
den of proof in the trial court.”)
29. See United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037 (10th Cir. 2009);
United States v. Owens, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81378 (N.D. Fla.
2009).
30. See United States v. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2009);
United States v. Buford, 623 F. Supp. 2d 923 (M.D. Tenn. 2009).
31. McCane v. United States, No. 09-402 (U.S., cert. denied Mar. 1,
2010).
32. 129 S.Ct. 2079 (2009).
33. 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
34. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
35. Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2090.  
36. Id. at 2097 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
38. Because a Miranda waiver also generally suffices as a waiver of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel (see Patterson v. Illinois, 487
U.S. 285 (1988)), the defendant’s Miranda and Sixth Amendment
claims will likely stand or fall together.
39. 129 S.Ct. 1841 (2009).
where the justices took “knock and announce” violations out
of the scope of the exclusionary rule).  Some judges have,
however, indicated that the burden is on the State to establish
that officers acted in good faith.28
Finally, Herring has had an interesting impact on the imple-
mentation of Gant.  A question that has already split the fed-
eral courts is whether evidence seized in violation of Gant
should nevertheless be admitted if officers reasonably relied
on Belton and its progeny, the law prior to Gant.  Citing
Herring, some courts have ruled that the evidence should not
be excluded because, under these circumstances, there would
not be a significant deterrent effect and the officers were not
sufficiently culpable.29 Other courts have held that the evi-
dence must be excluded because newly announced Supreme
Court decisions apply to cases then pending on direct appeal
under well-established principles of retroactivity.30 The
Supreme Court recently denied a petition for writ of certiorari
raising this issue.31
SIXTH AMENDMENT
Last Term saw very important rulings on the rights to
counsel, a jury trial, a speedy trial, the Sixth Amendment
exclusionary rule, and the Confrontation Clause.
Right to Counsel
In Montejo v. Louisiana,32 the Court overturned Michigan v.
Jackson,33 which forbade police from initiating questioning of
a defendant who requested counsel at an arraignment or other
similar judicial proceeding.  Jesse Montejo was arrested for
robbery and murder.  He was brought before a judge for a “72-
hour hearing,” a preliminary proceeding at which counsel is
customarily appointed.  A minute order showed that counsel
was appointed, but the order did not indicate whether the
defendant affirmatively asked for a lawyer or whether counsel
was simply appointed as a matter of routine (as is common in
a number of jurisdictions).  After the proceeding, police initi-
ated further questioning.  Montejo waived his Miranda rights
and, among other things, wrote an incriminating letter of apol-
ogy to the victim’s widow.  The letter was introduced at trial,
and Montejo was convicted and sentenced to death.  On
appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the decision,
finding no Jackson error because the record did not indicate
that the defendant actually requested a lawyer or otherwise
affirmatively invoked his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at
the “72-hour hearing.”
The U.S. Supreme Court took the case to decide whether
after the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel has attached,
a defendant must affirma-
tively ask for counsel or take
steps to “accept” a lawyer to
trigger Jackson’s protections.
Montejo argued that because
the appointment practices of
jurisdictions vary so much,
such a rule would be
unworkable.  After oral argu-
ment the justices called for supplemental briefing on whether
Jackson should be overruled.  By a vote of 5-4, the justices set
Jackson aside.
In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the majority charac-
terized Jackson as importing the rule of Edwards v. Arizona34
into the Sixth Amendment, stating that the only way to make
sense of Jackson is as protection from police badgering.  But the
majority noted that a defendant who has had counsel
appointed has other protections against badgering.  A waiver of
the right to counsel must be voluntary, and a defendant who
does not want to speak to the police without a lawyer “need
only say as much when he is first approached and given the
Miranda warnings,”35 which will trigger the protections of
Edwards.  The majority thought that the additional protections
of Jackson were not worth the costs and that the principles of
stare decisis were insufficient to require Jackson to be retained.
The primary dissent was written by Justice Stevens.  The dis-
senters contended that the majority misrepresented Jackson’s
underlying rationale and the constitutional interests the deci-
sion sought to protect.  Jackson, the dissenters wrote, is not
about police badgering.  Rather, “it is a rule designed to safe-
guard a defendant’s right to rely on the assistance of counsel.”36
Montejo represents a significant change in interrogation law
and may well spur new police practices.  While Montejo does
not undermine the old rule in Massiah v. United States37—under-
cover officers or informants still cannot elicit information from
a defendant after the right to counsel has attached—there is no
longer a bright-line rule prohibiting known officers from initi-
ating an interrogation and seeking a waiver of the right to coun-
sel.  Massiah aside, the main legal issues for post-arraignment
interrogations will now be the same as for interrogations prior
to arraignment:  compliance with Miranda and voluntariness.38
Last Term, the Court also addressed the scope of the Sixth
Amendment exclusionary rule when there is a violation of the
right to counsel.  The defendant in Kansas v. Ventris39 was in
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41. Id. at 1848 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
42. 129 S.Ct. 2527 (2009).
43. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
44. 129 S.Ct. at 2532.
45. Id. at 2531 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52).
46. Id. at 2540.
47. Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Vicars, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 17633
(3d Cir. 2009). 
48. People v. Lopez, 177 Cal. App. 4th 202 (Ct. App. 2009); Grant v.
Commonwealth, 682 S.E.2d 84 (Va. Ct. App. 2009).
49. People v. Dungo, 176 Cal. App. 4th 1388 (Ct. App. 2009); State v.
Locklear, 681 S.E.2d 293 (N.C. 2009).
50. People v. Payne, 2009 Mich. App. LEXIS 1592 (Mich. App. 2009);
Cuadros-Fernandez v. State, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 6896 (Tx. Ct.
App. 2009); but see Hamilton v. State, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 6923
(Tex. Ct. App. 2009).
51. Commonwealth v. Brown, 2009 Mass. App. LEXIS 1209 (Mass. Ct.
App. 2009).
the hoosegow, charged with
murder and aggravated
robbery.  Officers planted
an informant in his cell.
Following a conversation
with the informant, Ventris
made incriminating state-
ments, which the State
conceded were the product
of a violation of the right to
counsel (a Massiah viola-
tion).  These statements
were excluded from the
prosecution’s case-in-chief
but were admitted to
impeach Ventris’s testi-
mony at trial.  In a 7-2
decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the statement was
properly admitted for impeachment.  Writing for the majority,
Justice Scalia determined that the constitutional violation
occurred in the jail cell, and the informant spoke to the defen-
dant without counsel.  Comparing the Sixth Amendment
exclusionary rule with that of the Fourth Amendment (and
echoing the holding earlier in Herring), the majority stated
that exclusion is not automatic but instead depends upon a
balancing of relevant factors.  In this case, the Court wrote,
“the game of excluding tainted evidence for impeachment
purposes is not worth the candle.”40 The interests safe-
guarded by exclusion are outweighed by the need to prevent
perjury and assure the integrity of the trial.  Justices Stevens
and Ginsburg dissented.  They argued that while the constitu-
tional breach began during the questioning by the informant,
the use of that evidence at trial compounded the violation.  In
their view, “[t]he use of ill-gotten evidence during any phase
of criminal prosecution does damage to the adversarial
process—the fairness of which the Sixth Amendment was
designed to protect.”41
Confrontation
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts42 is the most recent
Confrontation Clause decision in the Crawford43 line of cases.
The defendant in Melendez-Diaz was charged with drug distri-
bution offenses.  Seized evidence was sent to a state laboratory.
At trial, the State introduced the seized evidence as well as
sworn “certificates of analysis” prepared by lab analysts.  The
certificates gave the weight of the substances and stated that
they contained cocaine.  In a 5-4 ruling, the Court held that the
introduction of the chemist’s notarized certificates violated the
Sixth Amendment where the analysts were not called at trial.
The majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, placed the
analysts’ sworn certificates squarely within the “core class of
testimonial statements” covered by the Confrontation Clause
as described in Crawford.44 Crawford referred to materials
such as affidavits or similar pretrial statements that prosecu-
tors would reasonably expect to be used at a later trial,45 and
sworn “certificates” are plainly affidavits.  The remainder of
the lengthy majority opinion was devoted to rebutting reasons
for removing affidavits about forensic evidence from the hold-
ing in Crawford.  The Court rejected claimed differences
between testimony recounting historical events and affidavits
relating to “neutral, scientific testing.”  The majority saw this
as an argument for a return to the pre-Crawford practice of
permitting the admission of evidence bearing “particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness” notwithstanding the
Confrontation Clause.  The justices also challenged the claims
that the admission of forensic evidence through affidavits had
a long pedigree, that these affidavits were akin to business
records, and that requiring live testimony would unduly inter-
fere with the criminal justice system.  Finally, the majority was
not persuaded by the fact that defendants could subpoena the
chemists.  As the opinion states, “the Confrontation Clause
imposes a burden on the prosecution to present its witnesses,
not on the defendant to bring those adverse witnesses into
court.”46 The dissenting justices, led by Justice Kennedy, con-
tested virtually every aspect of the majority opinion.  The dis-
senters forcefully argued that requiring these forensic experts
to appear at trial would have negligible benefits, threaten to
disrupt forensic investigations across the country, and put
prosecutions at risk.
The decision in Melendez-Diaz will have a substantial
impact.  Although the majority opinion notes that a number
of states already require testimony by forensic experts, there
are many jurisdictions that employ practices akin to that of
Massachusetts.  The majority addressed one way to lessen the
impact of the decision.  The Court noted that a number of
jurisdictions have adopted procedures through which the
prosecution gives notice of its intent to use a forensic analyst’s
report, and the defendant is then required to object and
demand the presence of the analyst at trial.
Melendez-Diaz has thus far been cited to find
Confrontation Clause violations due to the introduction of a
physician’s report evaluating a molestation victim,47 a report
of blood-alcohol content,48 an autopsy report,49 a report with
results of DNA analysis,50 a ballistics certificate,51 and govern-
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ment certificates showing the lack of a contractor’s license52 or
a motor vehicle operator’s permit,53 though these errors have
sometimes been found to be harmless.
A sequel to Melendez-Diaz was on the docket for the
Court’s current Term.  The Court granted certiorari in Briscoe
v. Virginia to decide whether a prosecutor may introduce a cer-
tificate of a forensic laboratory analysis, without presenting
the testimony of the analyst who prepared the certificate, if
the state provides a statutory mechanism for the accused to
call the analyst at the State’s expense. The justices heard argu-
ment but then simply vacated the decision and remanded for
further consideration in light of Melendez-Diaz.54
Speedy Trial
Vermont v. Brillon55 presented the question of whether
delays on the part of court-appointed counsel could be attrib-
uted to the State and thus support a dismissal for violation of
the right to a speedy trial.  Michael Brillon faced trial for
felony domestic assault.  During the almost three years that
the case awaited trial, he was represented by six different
lawyers.  They were discharged for different reasons.  The first
lawyer was relieved after his motion to continue the trial was
denied and the defendant fired him.  One lawyer was threat-
ened by the defendant.  Others were relieved because of diffi-
culties with their contracts with the State.  But it was also
clear that much of the delay was due to the inability or unwill-
ingness of assigned counsel to move the case forward.  For
this reason, Vermont’s Supreme Court found that the delay
violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.  In a 7-2 decision
authored by Justice Ginsburg, the Court ruled that appointed
counsel are not generally state actors for the purposes of a
speedy-trial claim.  Thus, most of the delay caused by the
lawyers must therefore be attributed to the defendant, rather
than to the State.  Claims of speedy-trial violations are
assessed under the balancing test of Barker v. Wingo,56 which
includes the length and reasons for the delay, the defendant’s
assertion of his rights, and prejudice.  With the lawyers’ delays
now attributed to Brillon and not the State, Brillon’s claim
failed.  The Court did note, however, that the general rule
attributing to the defendant delays caused by appointed coun-
sel is not absolute.  The State might be charged with delay if,
for example, there is a systemic breakdown in the public
defender system, though the record did not suggest such an
institutional problem in the case at bench.
Justices Breyer and Stevens dissented, pointing out (among
other things) substantial periods where it appeared that Brillon
had no counsel or where it was clear that assigned counsel
took no action at all and then withdrew; they also observed
that the state court had substantial authority to supervise the
appointment of public defenders.
Right to a Jury
Trial/Sentencing
Last Term also produced
Oregon v. Ice,57 yet another
in the Apprendi58 line of
cases.  Thomas Ice was con-
victed of six sexual offenses
following a jury trial.  At
sentencing, the judge made
a series of factual findings,
including that Ice’s conduct
caused different harms to
the victim, which then per-
mitted the court to impose
consecutive sentences.  The
issue was whether the Sixth
Amendment required a jury
determination of these facts.  A closely divided Supreme
Court found that judges may decide whether to impose con-
secutive sentences.
Writing for the five-justice majority, Justice Ginsburg
stressed that each offense involved its own discrete sentence
and that, historically, the jury played no part in assessing
whether sentences were consecutive as opposed to concur-
rent.  The Court also noted that the previous Apprendi cases
all involved sentencing for a discrete crime and not, as in Ice,
sentencing for multiple offenses different in character or com-
mitted at different points in time.  Historical practice and
respect for state sovereignty both counseled against applying
Apprendi to the imposition of sentences for separate crimes.
Justice Scalia authored the dissent.  He found no room to dis-
tinguish the earlier Apprendi cases since the facts found by the
judge were necessary to commit the defendant to a longer
prison term.  He argued that all of the considerations relied
upon by the majority were in fact rejected in the prior deci-
sions.  He concluded that the majority’s opinion “muddies the
waters, and gives cause to doubt whether Court is willing to
stand by Apprendi’s interpretation of the Sixth Amendment
jury-trial guarantee.”59
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Last Term saw two decisions on the collateral estoppel
principles relevant to the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy
Clause.  In the more important of the two, Yeager v. United
States,60 the defendant was tried on a variety of offenses relat-
ing to his employment as an officer of Enron Broadband
Services, including fraud and insider trading.  The jury acquit-
ted Yeager of the fraud counts but hung on the insider-trading
counts.  After a mistrial was declared on the latter counts, the
government obtained a new indictment recharging him with
some—but not all—of the insider-trading counts on which
the jury had earlier hung.  Yeager claimed that his reprosecu-
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tion violated the Double
Jeopardy Clause.  The lower
federal courts turned the claim
aside, but the Supreme Court
reversed.
Justice Stevens wrote the
opinion for the six-justice
majority.  The Court first
addressed the question whether
the government should be per-
mitted to retry Yeager on the
insider-trading counts simply because the jury had not
reached a verdict on them (and thus he could not twice be
placed in jeopardy).  The majority determined that that
approach would not sufficiently protect the interest in pre-
serving the finality of the jury’s judgment on the fraud counts,
including the jury’s alleged finding (as part of that judgment)
that Yeager did not possess insider information.  Thus, the
Court turned to Ashe v. Swenson61 and its holding that the
Double Jeopardy Clause precludes the government from relit-
igating an issue that was necessarily decided by an acquittal in
a prior trial.  The majority found that Ashe applied even
though the acquittal and the failure to reach a verdict
occurred during the same trial.  Although the jury hung on
the insider-trading counts, if the possession of insider infor-
mation was critical in all of the charges against Yeager, a jury
verdict that necessarily decided that issue in his favor would
protect him from prosecution for any charge for which that
was an essential element.  The Court remanded for the court
of appeals to determine what the jury necessarily determined
as part of its acquittal.62 Justice Scalia (joined by Justices
Thomas and Alito) dissented, criticizing Ashe as departing
from the original meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
They would have held that jeopardy is commenced and ter-
minated charge by charge, not issue by issue, and that having
never once been convicted of insider trading, Yeager could not
be placed twice in jeopardy on these charges.  Nor would
these justices extend Ashe to these circumstances.
The other case, Bobby v. Bies,63 addressed whether the
lower federal courts erred in preventing the state courts from
considering Bies’ mental capacity.  Bies was convicted and sen-
tenced to death.  On direct review, the Ohio Supreme Court
considered the balance of aggravating circumstances and mit-
igating factors and affirmed, but it observed that Bies’ mild to
borderline retardation was entitled to some weight.  The U.S.
Supreme Court later decided Atkins v. Virginia,64 which barred
the execution of mentally retarded offenders.  An Ohio court
then set a hearing on the question of Bies’ mental capacity.
The federal courts, however, intervened, determining that the
Ohio Supreme Court had definitively established Bies’ mental
retardation and that relitigation would violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause.  In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme
Court reversed.  As Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court, Bies
was not twice put in jeopardy of a death sentence.  Nor did the
opinion of the Ohio Supreme Court provide a basis for preclu-
sion under Ashe.  Bies’ appeal in the Ohio Supreme Court did
not involve a determination of an issue of ultimate fact in his
favor in the way contemplated in Ashe; determining his men-
tal capacity was not necessary to the Ohio court’s affirmation
of the sentence.  Moreover, mental retardation as a mitigator
and mental retardation for the purposes of Atkins present dis-
crete issues.
DUE PROCESS AND JURY SELECTION
While there are, of course, many constitutional dimensions
to the jury process, the decision last Term in Rivera v. Illinois65
made clear that some jury selection errors implicate only state
law.  The defendant in Rivera was on trial for murder.  His
lawyers sought to exercise a peremptory challenge.  The trial
judge disallowed it, raising a concern under Batson v.
Kentucky.66 The challenged juror eventually served as
foreperson.  The Illinois Supreme Court found that the trial
court should have allowed the peremptory challenge but that
the error was harmless.
The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously agreed.  In an opin-
ion by Justice Ginsburg, the Court noted that the
Constitution does not require states to provide peremptory
challenges.  These challenges can be withheld altogether
without infringing the constitutional right to an impartial
jury and a fair trial.  Denying a defendant a state-law right to
a peremptory challenge is not structural error.  The juror was
not challenged for cause, nor was there any claim that the
individual juror was biased.  The Court took care to point
out, and it is important to note here, that this was not a case
of an erroneous denial of a for-cause challenge (which would
deprive the defendant of an impartial jury).  Nor was this an
erroneous denial of a Batson objection (which would violate
the Equal Protection Clause) or an instance of a dismissal of
an otherwise death-eligible juror in violation of Witherspoon
v. Illinois.67 Nevertheless, Rivera established that erroneously
granting a Batson objection does not implicate federal law.  A
state might provide for automatic reversal under such cir-
cumstances as a matter of its own law, but no federal princi-
ple requires it to do so.
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
In Harbison v. Bell,68 the Supreme Court resolved a federal
statutory question that has important implications for the way
that both state and federal prisoners are represented toward
the end of capital litigation.  At issue was a federal statute, 18
U.S.C. § 3559, which provides for the appointment of counsel
for both state and federal capital defendants who bring federal
habeas corpus proceedings.  The statute also provides that
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unless the appointed lawyer is replaced, the attorney shall
represent the defendant through every subsequent stage of
available judicial proceedings “and shall also represent the
defendant in such competency proceedings and proceedings
for executive or other clemency as may be available to the
defendant.”69 The question was whether Harbison, who was
sentenced to death by a Tennessee state court, was entitled to
have his federal habeas corpus counsel continue to represent
him in state clemency proceedings at federal expense.  The
government argued that the statute only covered compensa-
tion for federal clemency proceedings, which are available
only to federal and not state defendants.
In a 7-2 decision, the Court ruled that the appointment con-
tinues through state clemency proceedings.  The opinion for
the Court, written by Justice Stevens, relies on the plain lan-
guage of the statute for this conclusion.  The majority noted
that the statute refers to clemency proceedings that “may be
available” and that only state clemency proceedings are avail-
able to defendants convicted in a state court.  Moreover, the
reference to “executive or other clemency” indicates that
Congress meant to include state proceedings, since some states
but not the federal government provide forms of clemency that
are other than executive.  The majority turned aside the claim
that this construction of the statute might also require feder-
ally appointed counsel to continue to represent clients in later
state habeas petitions or retrials, determining that these are not
subsequent stages of the federal habeas corpus proceedings.
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas concurred, but each
provided somewhat different reasoning.  Justices Scalia and
Alito dissented, contending that the federal statute provides
federally funded counsel for federal proceedings only.  The dis-
senters also rejected the majority’s attempt to distinguish sub-
sequent state habeas corpus litigation.
This is a significant ruling for courts and counsel that han-
dle capital post-conviction proceedings.  It ensures continuity
in representation and enables the federal post-conviction
lawyers to pursue clemency.  Since clemency is typically
sought near the end of the process, after federal habeas corpus
litigation has concluded, these lawyers have likely been repre-
senting the petitioner for a number of years and at this point
probably know the case and client best.  Even in states that
otherwise provide their own funding for capital clemency pro-
ceedings, it may be best for federal habeas counsel to make the
case for clemency, rather than appoint new lawyers so late in
the day.
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW
The Supreme Court decided a number of federal criminal
cases last Term.  Here are several that may be of particular
interest.
Federal statutes have long prohibited felons from possess-
ing firearms.  Congress later extended this prohibition to peo-
ple convicted of “a misdemeanor crime of domestic vio-
lence.”70 The question in
United States v. Hayes71 was
whether a misdemeanor
battery conviction counts as
a “crime of domestic vio-
lence” when the victim was
the offender’s spouse, but
the predicate offense statute
did not require a domestic
relationship as an element
of the offense.  In a 7-2 deci-
sion that looked closely at
the language of the statute, the majority ruled that the gov-
ernment must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the vic-
tim of the predicate offense was the accused’s current or for-
mer spouse or related to the defendant in another specified
way.  That relationship, though it must be established as a
matter of fact, need not be denominated an element of the
predicate offense.  Dissenting, Justices Roberts and Scalia
would require domestic violence to be an element in the pred-
icate offense.  They found the text of the statute ambiguous
and would have applied the rule of lenity.  The holding may
be of broad interest as it makes clear some of the conse-
quences of a conviction for even a misdemeanor offense where
the facts involve acts of domestic violence.
Corley v. United States72 afforded the Court the opportunity
to determine whether the rule in McNabb v. United States73 and
Mallory v. United States74 had been abrogated by statute.  The
McNabb-Mallory rule generally makes inadmissible confes-
sions obtained during periods of detention that do not comply
with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a); Rule 5(a)
requires an officer who arrests a suspect on a federal charge to
bring the defendant before a judicial officer without unneces-
sary delay, though there are some exceptions.  The McNabb-
Mallory rule was based on the Court’s supervisory power.  In
1968, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501.  Section 3501(a)
provides that a confession is admissible if voluntarily given,
and § 3501(b) describes the factors that relate to voluntariness.
Section 3501(c) provides that a confession is not inadmissible
because of delay if it is voluntary and made within six hours of
arrest; the subsection provides exceptions for reasonable delay.
Did 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a), with its seemingly unequivocal com-
mand that voluntary confessions be admitted, displace
McNabb-Mallory?  In a 5-4 decision, the Court said no.
Writing for the majority, Justice Souter examined the whole
statute.  He noted that §§ 3501(a) and (b) were a (failed) leg-
islative attempt to eliminate Miranda for federal criminal pros-
ecutions,75 while § 3501(c) had an altogether different pur-
pose.  The government’s argument, which placed full weight
on subsection (a), would render subsection (c) superfluous.
Taking the statute as a whole, the Court concluded that §
3501 narrowed McNabb-Mallory but did not displace it.  Thus,
a district court with a suppression claim must determine
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whether the defendant con-
fessed within six hours of
arrest, unless a longer delay
was reasonable.  If the con-
fession was made during
that time, it would be
admissible (subject to other
rules), so long as it was vol-
untary.  If the confession
occurred before the defen-
dant was brought before a
judicial officer and beyond
six hours, the trial court
must determine whether the
delay was unreasonable or
unnecessary under the
McNabb-Mallory rule.
Justice Alito authored the
dissent.  The dissenting jus-
tices would have applied §
3501 to displace McNabb-
Mallory even though it
would have made part (c) superfluous.  One other point of the
dissent is worth mentioning.  The four dissenters noted that
the Court has never held that the prompt presentment
requirements are backed by an automatic exclusionary sanc-
tion.  They also suggested that there was little need for
McNabb-Mallory given Miranda’s protections, a refrain that
recalls the holding in Montejo. 
Puckett v. United States76 addressed whether a forfeited
claim that the government violated the terms of a plea agree-
ment is subject to review on appeal as plain error.  Puckett
pled guilty and agreed to be truthful about his criminal activ-
ities.  At the time of the plea, the government agreed to rec-
ommend a reduction in his offense level under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines for acceptance of responsibility.
Puckett was sentenced several years later.  In the meantime,
he had helped another person defraud the government.  The
probation officer recommended that Puckett not receive any
reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and the prosecutor
then decided to oppose any such reduction.  Defense counsel
failed to object to the prosecutor’s changed position, and
Puckett did not receive the reduction.  The question on appeal
was whether the legal issue was forfeited or whether it could
be raised as plain error despite the failure to object.
In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court found that the plain-
error test of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) did not
apply and that the issue could not be raised.  The majority
opinion, written by Justice Scalia, points out the reasons for
requiring a contemporaneous objection:   including avoiding
sandbagging and giving the judge and the parties an opportu-
nity to resolve the mistake.  The Court rejected a number of
arguments raised by the defendant, including that a failure to
require the government to abide by the deal made the guilty
plea involuntary and that the government’s failure amounted
to structural error, affecting the framework within which the
proceeding operated.  Justices Souter and Stevens dissented.
While they did not find Puckett particularly sympathetic, they
argued that the prejudice to him was not the higher sentence
he ultimately received, but the loss of his right to a trial that he
waived as part of the agreement.   Even if the sentence would
have been the same, the government’s failure to live up to its
word branded Puckett a criminal without a trial because he
entered a guilty plea induced by a promise that the government
refused to honor.  This was plain error, said the dissenters.
The majority opinion contains one provocative suggestion.
While acknowledging that Santobello v. New York77 held that
automatic reversal is warranted when there is a timely objection
and the prosecution has breached a plea agreement, the Court
said there was no need to “confront today the question whether
Santobello’s automatic-reversal rule has survived our recent
elaboration of harmless-error principles” in other cases.78
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Knowles v. Mirzayance79 raised the question whether a fed-
eral habeas corpus petitioner was entitled to relief when his
counsel advised him to withdraw his insanity defense.
Mirzayance pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of insan-
ity.  California, where he was tried, adjudicates such cases in
bifurcated proceedings.  Mirzayance was convicted of first-
degree murder in the guilt phase.  His lawyer advised
Mirzayance to withdraw the insanity defense prior to the
insanity phase.  Counsel concluded that the defense would
fail.  The Ninth Circuit granted relief, finding that failure to
pursue the insanity defense was deficient performance since
there was no tactical advantage in withdrawing the plea—in
essence, counsel had “nothing to lose” by presenting the
defense.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed.  Justice
Thomas wrote for the Court that the state court’s rejection of
the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was consistent
with Strickland.80 Counsel is not required to have a tactical
reason for dropping a weak claim, above and beyond a rea-
sonable appraisal of the claim’s prospects for success.  Nor is
counsel required to raise every non-frivolous defense.  And
under these circumstances, Mirzayance could not show preju-
dice.  There was no reasonable probability that he would have
prevailed on the insanity defense had he pursued it.  In addi-
tion, in a part of the opinion that commanded six votes, the
Court also ruled that Mirzayance could not show that the
state-court decision was contrary to or involved an unreason-
able application of “clearly established Federal law, as deter-
mined by the Supreme Court,” which is the showing man-
dated by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA).81 No U.S. Supreme Court decision had previously
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established a “nothing to lose” standard.  Under the “doubly
deferential” standard that applies to Strickland allegations
evaluated under AEDPA, Mirzayance could not prevail with a
generalized Strickland claim.82
Jury Instructions
The issue in Hedgpeth v. Pulido83 was whether a particular
instructional error is structural or whether it is subject to
harmless-error analysis.  Pulido was charged with felony mur-
der.  The jury was instructed on alternative theories of guilt,
one of which was invalid, and may have relied on the invalid
theory to convict (though that was not certain, as the jury
returned a general verdict).  The district court granted
Pulido’s federal habeas corpus petition, finding that the flawed
instruction had a “substantial and injurious effect” or influ-
ence on the verdict, the standard set forth in Brecht v.
Abrahamson.84 The State appealed.  The Ninth Circuit
affirmed but rather than apply Brecht, the court of appeals
determined that the error was structural and not subject to
harmless-error review.
The Supreme Court reversed in a 6-3 per curiam decision.
The majority distinguished several earlier rulings85 that sup-
ported Pulido because those cases were decided before the
Supreme Court determined in Chapman v. California86 that
constitutional errors can be harmless.  The Court was more
persuaded by recent holdings that other forms of instructional
error are subject to harmless-error review.  The matter was
remanded for the court of appeals to assess whether the error
was harmless under Brecht; the majority declined to apply
Brecht in the first instance.  Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg dissented, contending that the court of appeals’
analysis and the record clearly show that the error was not
harmless under Brecht. 
Timeliness/Default
In Jimenez v. Quarterman,87 the Court addressed a not
uncommon question:  whether a federal habeas corpus peti-
tion was timely filed under AEDPA’s one-year statute of limi-
tations, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).  Section 2244 provides that
the year begins to run on “the date on which the judgment
became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expira-
tion of the time for seeking such review.”  Jimenez’s state
appellate lawyer filed an Anders88 brief, which he left for
Jimenez at the county jail.  Unfortunately, Jimenez was no
longer at the jail, and so he received neither the brief nor the
subsequent order of dismissal.  When he later learned of the
error, he filed a state habeas corpus petition and asked the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals for leave to file an out-of-
time appeal.  That court granted him leave.  The appeal was
filed, and the conviction was affirmed.  Jimenez later filed a
federal habeas corpus petition within a year of the conclusion
of his reopened avenue of appeal.  The lower federal courts,
however, considered the
one-year period to begin to
run from the conclusion of
the initial appeal, not
Jimenez’s reopened path of
review.
The Supreme Court
reversed in a unanimous
opinion written by Justice
Thomas.  The Court held
that direct review does not
conclude until the avail-
ability of direct appeal to
the state courts and to the
U.S. Supreme Court has
been exhausted.  Once the
Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals reopened the
direct review of the conviction, the petitioner’s conviction was
no longer final for purposes of the federal habeas corpus
statute.  This construction furthered AEDPA’s goal of promot-
ing comity, finality, and federalism since it permitted the state
court the first opportunity to review the claim and to address
any constitutional errors. 
Cone v. Bell89 dealt with an issue of procedural default.
Cone raised an insanity defense in his murder trial but was
convicted and sentenced to death.  His defense was based in
part upon his drug use, which the prosecution discredited at
trial.  Years afterwards, Cone learned that the State had sup-
pressed evidence of his drug use, and he then asserted a vio-
lation of Brady v. Maryland.90 The case had a complicated pro-
cedural history, but the bottom line was that due to the late
disclosure of this evidence and the way the case was litigated,
the state courts never considered the merits of the Brady claim
in light of this newly disclosed evidence (and in fact the state
courts had found that the claim was waived or otherwise
defaulted).  The State reasserted its arguments of default in
federal court.
In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the claim
was not barred.  In federal habeas corpus litigation, the ade-
quacy of state procedural bars is itself a federal question.  The
majority determined that the state courts had not passed on
the merits of the claim, and that the state courts had erred in
finding that the Brady claim was defaulted or waived.  The
majority went on to consider the merits of the claim.  The
Court decided that the likelihood was remote that the sup-
pressed evidence would have affected the jury’s verdict on the
issue of insanity but that the evidence may have been mater-
ial to the jury’s assessment of the proper punishment.  The
majority remanded to the district court to consider the merits
of the claim with respect to the sentence.  Justices Thomas
and Scalia dissented.  While they agreed that the claim was
The majority 
distinguished 
several earlier 
rulings that 
supported Pulido
because those cases
were decided before
the Supreme Court
determined in
Chapman v.
California that 
constitutional errors
can be harmless.
91. 129 S.Ct. 855 (2009).
92. 129 S.Ct. 808 (2009).
93. 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009).
94. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
95. 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009).
not defaulted, they would
have rejected the entire Brady
claim on the merits.  Justice
Alito would have remanded
for further proceedings,
including a question of
whether the Brady claim was
fully exhausted or barred.
CIVIL RIGHTS
Four civil-rights cases
from last Term may also be of interest to criminal-court judges
and practitioners.  Three of the rulings underscore some of
the difficulties for federal civil-rights plaintiffs in suing prose-
cutors and law-enforcement officers.  The fourth case
addresses whether § 1983 may be used to obtain DNA evi-
dence and also contains important holdings about Brady, the
Due Process Clause, and claims of actual innocence.
The trio of civil-rights cases are Van de Kamp v. Goldstein,91
Pearson v. Callahan,92 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.93 Van de Kamp was
a suit against a county district attorney and a supervising
prosecutor alleging that the defendants failed to train prose-
cutors, supervise them, or establish a system so that exculpa-
tory information relating to jailhouse informants would be
disclosed to defense counsel.  A unanimous Court determined
that the prosecutors were absolutely immune from liability,
turning aside an argument that the defendants should not
receive absolute immunity as these alleged failures were
administrative and not prosecutorial conduct.  
Pearson overruled Saucier v. Katz,94 which had instructed
federal courts to follow a two-step process in determining
whether government officials were entitled to qualified immu-
nity:  first, whether there was a constitutional violation, and
second, whether the unconstitutionality of the officers’ con-
duct was clearly established.  Pearson now gives judges the
discretion to determine which prong should be addressed first
(and thus a case may be dismissed on qualified-immunity
grounds by going to the second prong without deciding
whether there was a constitutional violation at all).  The
Pearson Court thus determined that officers were entitled to
immunity without deciding an interesting Fourth
Amendment question about the constitutionality of a war-
rantless entry into a home when consent to enter was given to
an undercover informant (sometimes called “consent-once-
removed”). 
Iqbal, which may be the most significant of the trio,
involved allegations that the plaintiff was selected for pretrial
detention in a federal maximum security unit and subjected to
beatings and other abuses on the basis of his race, religion,
and national origin.  He alleged that Attorney General
Ashcroft and FBI Director Mueller knew about and condoned
this discriminatory treatment and may even have been instru-
mental in adopting and executing the discriminatory policy.
A closely divided Court found that there can be no supervi-
sory liability for knowledge of and mere acquiescence in an
unconstitutional action by a subordinate.  Next, the majority
decided that the allegations against the two officials were
insufficiently detailed to meet ordinary pleading require-
ments, that of presenting plausible (and not merely conceiv-
able) claims of invidious discrimination.  Iqbal has enormous
importance with respect to civil-pleading standards and, of
course, the principles of supervisory liability.
The final case, District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial
District v. Osborne,95 was the government’s appeal from a rul-
ing in a § 1983 civil-rights action granting a former defendant
access to evidence for DNA testing.  Osborne was convicted of
a violent sexual assault in a state court in Alaska.  Before his
trial, the State tested a sperm sample found at the crime scene
using a somewhat nondiscriminating test.  In postconviction
proceedings, Osborne sought access to better and more dis-
criminating DNA testing, but access was denied.  The lower
federal courts, however, found that he had a potentially viable
claim of actual innocence and that he had a right of access to
evidence to perform DNA testing.  The Supreme Court
reversed.
In a 5-4 decision authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the
Court emphasized that the dilemma of figuring out how to
harness DNA’s power to prove innocence without unnecessar-
ily interfering with the criminal justice system belongs pri-
marily to the legislatures of the various states.  The majority
noted that Osborne had a state-created liberty interest in
demonstrating his innocence (since Alaska law provides that
those who use newly discovered evidence to establish inno-
cence may vacate their conviction or sentence) but that
Alaska’s procedures were adequate under the Due Process
Clause.  The justices underscored the differences between the
process due an individual before conviction and after convic-
tion and noted that Brady did not apply.  Several justices con-
curred to emphasize a few additional concerns, such as the
use of civil-rights actions to bring claims that potentially
might be brought on habeas corpus, as well as the burdens
that postconviction DNA testing imposes upon federal and
state governments.  Justice Stevens wrote the main dissent.
Four justices would have found that the State’s procedures did
not comport with the Due Process Clause.  Three of the dis-
senting justices would also have found a substantive due-
process right of access to evidence for purposes of previously
unavailable DNA testing.
A LOOK AHEAD
The October 2009 Term also promises to be quite signifi-
cant.  As the Term opens, the justices plan to revisit some
issues that have commanded a fair amount of attention in
recent years; cases involving the Second Amendment,
Apprendi, and the Confrontation Clause are again on the
docket.  The Court also will address several aspects of
Miranda, as well as an assortment of other matters.  Here are
some of the most interesting cases.
Four civil-rights
cases from last
Term may also be
of interest to 
criminal-court
judges and 
practitioners.
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The blockbuster case of two Terms ago was District of
Columbia v. Heller,96 where the justices ruled that the Second
Amendment protects an individual’s right to keep and bear
arms.  Now the Court has granted review in McDonald v.
Chicago97 to determine whether this right is incorporated as
against the states through the Privileges and Immunities or
Due Process clauses.  
The Court will take on yet another Apprendi issue, deciding
in United States v. O’Brien98 whether the fact that a firearm is a
machine gun must be charged and proved to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt before a defendant may be given a 30-year
mandatory minimum sentence. 
Miranda is front-and-center.  Maryland v. Shatzer,99 a
closely watched case, concerns how long the Edwards v.
Arizona prohibition against reinterrogation may last.  While in
prison on one charge, Shatzer invoked his right to counsel
during an investigation of a different sexual abuse charge.
Still in prison more than 2-1/2 years later, he was re-interro-
gated by a different detective.  The Maryland Court of Appeals
ruled that the Edwards prohibition remained effective and that
there had been no break in custody.  The state court deter-
mined that it would apply Edwards absent further guidance
from the Supreme Court.  Another Miranda issue is presented
in Florida v. Powell,100 which addresses whether Miranda
warnings are defective if they fail to include advice of the right
to talk to a lawyer during questioning (as opposed to before
questioning).  The ruling may have broad implications
because the social science literature has reported a remarkable
variation in the form, language, and understandability of
warnings used by law-enforcement agencies.101
But perhaps the most important of the three Miranda cases
is Berghuis v. Thompkins,102 where officers continued to ques-
tion a suspect who remained largely silent for the first two
hours and 45 minutes of his interrogation.  The case has great
practical and theoretical implications.  With a number of law-
enforcement agencies regularly seeking implied and not
express waivers of Miranda,103 the case should help clarify the
role of officers when a suspect simply does what the warnings
promise him he may do:  remain silent.  The case may provide
an opportunity to determine whether the Davis v. United
States104 “clear invocation” rule should be extended to the
right to remain silent as well as the right to counsel, and
whether the rule should also be extended to the initial waiver
stage (as opposed to coming into play only to determine
whether a defendant who initially waived his rights has
changed his mind and is now
invoking them).  The matter
is before the Court on a
habeas corpus petition, how-
ever, and the resolution of
these questions may be com-
plicated by the standard of
review under AEDPA. 
Other issues about the
federal habeas corpus statute
post-AEDPA will also
occupy the Court.  Among
the cases this Term are
McDaniel v. Brown,105 which
addresses how a federal
habeas corpus court can adjudicate a “sufficiency-of-the-evi-
dence” claim under AEDPA, and Berguis v. Smith,106 which
concerns the review of an alleged violation of the Sixth
Amendment’s fair cross-section requirement post-AEDPA.
Also on the docket is Holland v. Florida,107 which relates to the
circumstances in which a petitioner may be entitled to equi-
table tolling to excuse the late filing of a petition.  
Two other much anticipated cases are Graham v. Florida108
and Sullivan v. Florida.109 They deal with whether the Eighth
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments forbids
imposing life without parole sentences on juveniles who are
not convicted of homicide offenses.
Another case that may be of wide interest is Padilla v.
Kentucky,110 where the justices will decide if a lawyer who
gives erroneous advice about the immigration consequences
of a conviction is constitutionally ineffective.  The Court
might additionally consider whether a lawyer representing a
non-citizen has a duty to give advice about those immigration
consequences.
The Court also plans to decide the constitutionality of sev-
eral federal statutes.  United States v. Stevens111 asks whether a
federal law criminalizing the creation, sale, and possession of
“depiction[s] of animal cruelty” is facially invalid under the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.  The Third
Circuit overturned the conviction of the defendant, a film-
maker, and the government sought Supreme Court review.
Carr v. United States112 asks whether a federal law that imposes
registration requirements on sex offenders can be applied to
individuals whose predicate offenses and proscribed travel
took place before the statute was passed.
96. 128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008).
97. No. 08-1521.
98. No. 08-1569.
99. No. 08-680.
100. 08-1175.
101. See Richard Rogers, Kimberly S. Harrison, Daniel W. Shuman,
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Kenneth W. Sewell, Kimberly S. Harrison & Daniel W.
Shuman, The Language of Miranda Warnings in American
Jurisdictions: A Replication and Vocabulary Analysis, 32 LAW &
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103. See Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CAL. L. REV.
1519, 1577-90 (2008).
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114. No. 08-1196.
115. Skilling v. United States, No. 08-1394.
Finally, white-collar-crime aficionados might note the bevy
of mail-fraud questions that are on the docket.  Black v. United
States113 concerns whether a person may be convicted under
the federal mail-fraud statute for depriving another of “the
intangible right of honest services,” even if there is no finding
that the defendant contemplated economic harm to the party
to whom “honest services” were owed.  The Court also
granted review in Weyhrauch v. United States,114 another case
interpreting the same statute.  There the question is whether
a state official may be convicted of depriving the public of the
defendant’s honest services for allegedly failing to disclose
conflicts of interest without proof of a separate duty of disclo-
sure imposed by state law.  And the conviction of former
Enron executive Jeffrey Skilling is before the Court in a case
that raises an issue of the meaning of honest-services fraud as
well as how the prosecution may rebut a presumption of jury
prejudice that may arise from massive pretrial publicity.115
The present Term will be quite interesting to watch.
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